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Abstract 
In this dissertation I will expose the process that lead me to give BPI a BUY 
recommendation for a price target of 1,75€ (against 1,466€ in August 2014). 
My work adds to the investment community (compared with the BCP report of 
May 2014) by giving a more detailed and forward-looking valuation. Detailed 
because I valuate domestic and international activities separately, accounting 
this way for a higher risk in the latter, but also greater profitability. Forward 
looking because I value BPI based on the excess return it is expected to 
generate. Using this approach I penalized BPI in the near future but I captured 
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Executive Summary  
The return of the NII 
 
A new chapter has just started for BPI. In August 2014 the bank has already paid back all the 
borrowed capital to the Portuguese government, has strengthen its financial position, reduced 
its main risk exposures1 and almost completed its cost-reduction plan.  
 
• BPI is no longer dependent on the developments of the debt crisis. The bank 
has reduced significantly its exposure to Government debt, holding now 
€850M (only Portuguese Debt); one third of its exposure in 2012. 
• The banks credit structure, based in mortgages loans, made it more resilient 
to the deterioration of credit quality felt in Portugal. Credit at Risk stands at 
5,1%, the lowest in Portugal.  
• NII is expected to pick up. On the cost side, the heavy weight of the CoCoʼs2 
has been eliminated, and aggressive cost-cutting policy is underway. On the 
revenue side a new credit structure is expected, with an increase on the 
corporate side, as investments start to pick up. At the same time we watch a 
decrease in the deposit yields, as banks are not competing so aggressively 
for fund 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  Government	  debt	  portfolio	  is	  now	  only	  one	  third	  of	  2012	  values	  
	  
2	  Contingent	  convertible	  bonds	  subscribed	  100%	  by	  the	  Portuguese	  government	  in	  2012	  
Recommendation: BUY 
 
M€ 2013 2014E 2015E 
Price Target (YE14):  € 1,75 
 
Total Assets  43 795,10   41 602,60   43 922,63  
Upside: 
Vs €1,46   19% 
 
NII  475,10     513,96     614,21    
BPI change (YTD) 63,53% 
 
Dividends 0 0 0 
PSI20 (YTD) -0,22% 
 
Cost credit Risk 1,05% 0,67% 0,76% 
PT / Financials -89,72% 
 
Net profit 66,9 -12,04 212,69 
Bloomberg: BPI PL 
 
CET1 (%) 9,98% 10,77% 10,74% 
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Part I. Literature Review 
 
 
1. Introduction - “All roads lead to Rome” 
The first myth of equity valuation (Damodaran 2002) is that valuation is 
objective, since models are quantitative. There are indeed a lot of quantitative 
models to value a company; they exist due to the importance in todayʼs 
financial world of finding the ʻvalueʼ of a company. ʻWhat is surprising, (…) is 
not the differences in valuation techniques across assets, but the degree of 
similarity in basic principles.ʼ (Damodaran 2002). All valuation models are based on 
the underlying assumption that the value of a company needs to be backed up 
by something real, not just how others price it. Value is backed up by the cash 
flows that the company is expected to generate in the future; different models 
just get to these cash flows differently, depending on industry or capital 
structure or country. What makes valuations subjective are the inputs to the 
models, the assumptions the analyst makes regarding the future; because the 
future is uncertain. However, if the assumptions are consistent, the value 
obtained using different models should be quite similar if not the same; 
because “all roads lead to Rome” (Holt, W., Nokhasteh, A., Sullivan, P., 
Young, M. (1999)) 
 
Different paths  
There are two main ways to get to the value of equity: the first is the direct 
one, valuating just the equity stake of the company. The second, the indirect, 
consists in valuing the whole company and later discount everything that is 
not equity (debt). There are also 3 main different valuation approaches that 
can be either direct or indirect: 
 
1. Discounted Cash Flow 
a. Free Cash Flow to the Firm  
b. Free Cash Flow to the Equity 
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c. Dividend Discount Model 
a. Adjusted Present Value 
b. Economic value added 
c. Economic Profit 
d. Cash Value Added 
e. Dynamic ROE 







3. Contingent Claim Valuation 
a. Option theory 
 
This thesis has the objective of valuing a financial institution, Banco 
Português de Investimento (BPI) therefore, next will be discussed the possible 
valuation methods for financial institutions.  
 
1.1. Note on Financial Institutions 
There are four key particularities in financial institutions that make them a 
special regarding equity valuation. First Financial institutions operate under 
regulatory requirements that dictate how much capital they need to have and 
how to use it (how much can they grow). Second, accounting rules are quite 
particular, with most of the assets are mark-to market. Third, debt is difficult to 
define as it is used as a ʻraw materialʼ for the bank to produce loans. 
Enterprise value for a bank is practically meaningless as it is very difficult to 
distinguish between debt and raw materials. Also, the principal source of 
funding is deposits and interbank loans; both will have a very low interest rate 
that would make the Weighted Cost of Capital (WACC) unrealistically low. 
Forth, and lastly, is the definition of reinvestment. While a manufacturing 
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company invests in factories to increase production capacity, a financial 
institution invests in regulatory capital (increase capital to increase capacity to 
generate new loans). It will be argued further in this dissertation how a new 




2. Valuation Models - Discount Cash flow 
This is the group of models more used in practice, it fits perfectly the 
philosophical description of equity valuation: the value of the company is its 
expected cash flows it is expected to generate in the future, discounted to the 
present.  
 
Because it is hard to accurately define debt for a bank, and the WACC would 
be undervalued, for financial institutions there is the need to use direct 
valuation methodologies: valuing equity rather than the assets. Damodaran 
(2009) defines the free cash flow to equity as: 
 
!"##  !"#ℎ!"#$  !"  !"#$%&   !"!#
=   !"#  !"#$%& − !"#  !"#$%"&  !"#$%&'()*$
− !ℎ!"#$  !"  !"!  !"#ℎ  !"#$%&'  !"#$%"& − (!"#$  !"#$%&
− !"#  !"#$  !""#!") 
(Equation 1) 
 
Filling this equation is not a straightforward exercise when dealing with 
financial institutions. There is the need to redefine the reinvestment needs, 
both the capital expenditures (CAPEX) and working capital. In this regard the 
Damodaran (2009) presents three solutions:  
Use dividends as cash flows, by assuming that the company over time pays 
their free cash flow to equity as dividends. Because they are observable, this 
approach adds the extra benefit of not facing the question of how much does 
a firm reinvest. The model is called Dividend Discount Model (DDM) and will 
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be discussed in the next section (Part I. 2.1.). The second solution is to 
assume all reinvestment is made in regulatory capital, since this is the one 
that enables banks to grow larger (make more loans). This is the Free Cash 
Flow to equity model (FCFE) and will be discussed in Part I. 2.2. In the last 
section, Part I 2.3. , the focus will be on excess returns, following the Residual 
Income Model.  
 
2.1. Dividend Discount Models 
Dividend Discount Model (DDM) is very simple in their background reasoning: 
the price of a stock should reflect all the future cash flows that the stock will 
generate. Those cash flows are the dividends. The analyst needs to assume 
that all the cash flows to equity investors are paid though dividends, this is not 
a very damaging assumption but in reality, companies have other instruments 
to remunerate investors, (like stock buybacks).  
The basic model introduced by William (1938): 
 








!"#! is the dividend at time t 
E(.) means the dividend is expected  
!! is the cost of equity 
 
Because this model simplifies too much reality, making the dividend constant 
forever, Gordon (1962) upgraded it to allow dividends to grow in the future (at 
a constant rate). 
 






! is the perpetual dividend growth rate 
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This model is more flexible, it can be modified to allow for an extraordinary 
growth period and only then apply the steady state dividend growth rate.  
 
The DDM is a simple model needing only 3 inputs: Cost of equity (ke), to 
discount the cash flow, (this input is also used in the FCFE approach and is 
obtained using the CAPM model discussed ahead). Payout ratio and expected 
divided growth rate (g), they are connected according to the following 
equation: 
! = 1− !"#$%&  !"#$% ∗ !"#!"#$%&  !"#$%! 
(Equation 4) 
 
The Return on Equity (ROE) is here critical for the valuation, together with the 
payout ratio will help determine growth, as two variables imply the third one. It 
is particularly important for banks as they are required by law to maintain 
certain capital ratios; the less they pay as dividends the more they can grow. 
In this sense the assumption on how much will be the steady state ROE is 
crucial3.  
This valuation approach is widely used in financial institutions as their capital 
structure tends to be constant, (due to regulations), and the dividend yield 
tends to be fixed by the management. It is also very practical as no 
calculations need to be made to arrive at the cash flow value. 
 
The main drawback of this method is that dividends may not be linked to 
value creation. Damodaran (2006) points that firms can holdback more 
earnings for future investments or the other way around; they can pay the 
dividend even when they are not able to do so, just for the sake of fulfilling its 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  It	  will	  be	  discussed	  ahead	  in	  Part	  V.	  2.4.	  –	  Terminal	  value	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2.2. Free Cash-Flow to Equity 
Banks do not invest like other firms, their reinvestments needs are not in 
plants nor in inventory, they invest in regulatory capital so they are allowed to 
grow their asset side according with the applicable law requirements. Thus we 
only need to change the Equation 1 to:4  
 
!"##  !"#ℎ  !"#$  !"  !"#$%&!"#$#%"$&  !"#$%&'(  !" !
= !"#  !"#$%& − !"#$%"&'("$'  !"  !"#$%&'()*  !"#$%"& 
(Equation 5) 
 
To arrive ate a good estimative for the Reinvestment in Regulatory Capital 
there are two important considerations. First is how conservative is the 
company? Does it desires to hold the imposed capital? Or in addition hold a 
buffer. Second is the profitability of the activity, as net profit has a direct 
impact on the companyʼs equity.  
 
 
2.3. Excess Return Model 
Another way to value firms is to sum the capital currently invested and then 
add the present value of the excess returns, which the firm is expected to 
generate on its capital. Because a bank will be valued, instead of valuing the 
whole capital it is useful to value directly the equity following this equation:5 
 
!"#$%  !"  !"#$%&
= !"#$%&  !"#$%"&  !"#$%&$'  !"##$%&'(
+ !"#$#%&  !"#$%  !"  !"#!$%!&  !"#$%%  !"#$%&'  !"  !"#$%&  !"#$%&'(% 
(Equation 6) 
 
With this model the analyst will have not only to how the financial institution 
will invest in the future but also the returns it will make on those investments. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  According	  with	  Damodaran	  (2009)	  	  
5	  According	  with	  Damodaran	  (2009)	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The model has two inputs: the equity already invested, and the expected 
excess returns to equity investors in the future. For the first the book value of 
equity can be used; bear in mind that this is only true for financial institutions, 
as the financial assets are marked up to market, (also the depreciation is 
negligible). The second is the Excess Equity Return, which can be obtained 
looking to the ROE and the cost of equity:6 
 
!"#$%%  !"#$%&  !"#$%&
= !"#$%&  !"  !"#$%& − !"#$  !"  !"#$%&
∗ (!"#$%&  !"#$%"&  !"#$%&$') 
(Equation 7) 
 
Note that the ROE needs to be forward looking for the model to make sense; 




3. Valuation Models - Relative Valuation 
In this kind of model, the companyʼs value is “based upon how similar assets 
are currently priced in the market” Damodaran (2002). A multiple is a ratio of 
the stock price (Equity value multiple) or the Enterprise value (Firm value 
multiple) to some value driver (earnings, sales or book value are just three 
examples). Since in this dissertation a bank will be valued, an Equity value is 
more appropriate due to the debt-measurement problems that have been 
already discussed.  Damodaran (2009) makes a particular focus on Price-
earnings ratio (P/E) and Price to book value (P/BV), being the first dependent 
on expected growth rate in earnings, the payout ratio and the cost of equity. 
The second is mostly dependent on return on equity (ROE). Being ROE the 
most important value driver for financial institutions it is not a surprise that 
Fernandez (2013) said the P/BV is the most used multiple for banks. This is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  According	  to	  Damodaran	  (2009)	  
7	  This	  will	  be	  discussed	  ahead	  in	  section	  XXXXX	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because a bank will only trade at a P/BV higher than one if it is expected to 
generate excess return in the future (Equation 7).  
 
One of the biggest advantage of relative valuation is how easy it is to apply, 
Schreiner (2006) structures four stages: selection of the value driver, selection 
of the comparable group, building a synthetic multiple and finally applying the 
value driver of the company to the calculated synthetic multiple.  
 
DCF valuation is the most used and trusted of all valuation techniques, 
however it has a very important pitfall, the valuation is based in subjective 
assumptions, “accurately estimating companyʼs cash-flows and choosing the 
appropriate discount rate are difficult” (Lie & Lie, 2002). Indeed relative 
valuation is much more straightforward as it does not rely on assumptions, 
which implies that valuation values should not differ a lot from different 
analysts. However it still has a subjective input into it, the choice of the peer 
(comparable) group. Adding the high number of multiples available to use, it is 
possible that multiple valuations can be easily manipulated; any analyst can 
get this way to any ʻdesiredʼ value. Fernandez (2013) also points to the fact 
that multiples have broad dispersion, which implies that they provide a static 
valuation that is dependent of the market mood at the moment when the 
valuation is made; this can be seen as a relative value rather than the intrinsic 
value (which can be obtained using a DCF approach). In this regard 
Fermandez (2013) also points that multiples should be used as a “second 
stage of the valuation” so it enables the analyst to “gage the valuation 
performed and identify differences between the firm valued and the firms it is 
compared with”.  
 
 
4. Valuation Models - Option Models 
Assets that behave like options need to be priced in a different way than all 
the others. Option-like assets do not follow the basic rule that the value of the 
company equals the sum of its discounted cash flows. This is because their 
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value is dependent in other assets or dependent in the occurrence, or not, of a 
specific event in the future. Because banks do not behave like an option-like 
asset this topic with not be further discussed in this dissertation.  
 
 
5. Cross-border valuation 
BPI operates at the moment two in major markets, Portugal and Angola. 
Being Angola a developing country there are special consideration related to 
equity valuation that need to be addressed. It is clear that countries with 
different levels of development need different strategies and investment 
policies, and for the bankʼs valuation different underlying assumptions.  
First there is a different currency and different tax rate, second the timing 
when to discount the cash flows: when they are earned or then they sent back 
home. Third the calculation of the WACC, more risks need to be incorporated 
as political risk. Finally the macroeconomic scenario is different, different 
growth levels and different regulatory requirements that the bank will face 
(Kenneth A., and W. Carl Kester 1997). 
In addition, for developing countries investors demand being rewarded by the 
extra risks that may arise due to macroeconomic volatility, political unrest, war 
or corruption. These risks are not considered in the CAPM, however there are 
two ways to add them to the valuation (Mimi James and Timothy M. Koller 
2000): by incorporating in the actual cash-flows (changing the numerator in 
the DCF calculation) or adding an extra risk premium to the discount rate (the 
denominator). The authors argue that the first option is the best since it 
enable analysts to diversify the risk, as it does not apply in the same way to all 
industries and most times not even to all companies within and industry. Also 
finance theory is clear, in the CAPM only non-diversifiable risk is considered 
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6. The Cost of Equity  
The cost of equity is one of the most important inputs for most valuation 
models, (except relative valuation), so it is important to overview how it can be 
determined. The return on equity that the investor requires reflects the risk 
that cannot be diversified away, this is measured by a beta, using the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM, Equation 9) or by a number of betas (multi factor 
model). Even though the CAPM cannot be tested (following Rollʼs critique that 
the market portfolio cannot be obtained) Fama & French (1996) argue that the 
existing evident is enough to infer that the CAPM provides bad 
approximations for beta. However, in the end of the day, practitioners use the 
CAPM, implying that all rely in its assumptions, and thus agreeing that it is 
valid. 
Following Fama & French (2004), “the market beta for an asset i, is the 
covariance of its return with the market return divided by the variance of 









!! is the beta of the asset i 
!"#(!! , !!) is the convaciance of the returns 
!!! is the variance of the markets returns 
 
CAPM: 
!! = !! + !!(!! − !!) 
(Equation 9) 
Where: 
!! is the risk-free rate 
!! is the expected market return 
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Damodaran (2002) argues there are 3 ways to estimate the Beta: Historical 
Betas (same approach as Fama French (2004) described above), estimated 
from Fundamental characteristic of the investment or use accounting betas.  
To estimate Historical betas one need to regress the historical returns of the 
investment against a benchmark market portfolio and take the beta (Equation 
8). There are however a multitude of ways to do that, first the choice of 
estimation period. Here one needs to evaluate the trade-off between quantity 
of data and noise; also the company in question may change its risk structure 
if the estimation period is too long. Second the return interval, which faces a 
similar problem as the estimation period. Third the choice of market index, this 
choice should not be only based on where the company is based, (choosing 
this way the national index), but where this company operates.  
 
However, the cost of equity in a far too important input to discount cash flow 
models to used noisy and skewed estimations of betas. Damodaran argues 
that a better way to estimate betas is using firm fundamentals: the type of 
business they are in and their degree of leverage (operating and financial). 
In the fundament approach business risk is separated from leverage risk by 
calculating first the Unleveraged Beta (also called Asset beta) that is 
determined by the kind of assets the company uses, and then the leveraged 
(or equity) beta that reflects both the Risk of the business and the firm-specific 
leverage risk; which will be the one eventually used for the CAPM model.  
 
To get the unleveraged Beta first it the activity of the firm must be defined. If 
the company has more than one activity the beta will be the weighted, (by the 
importance of that segment to the companyʼs value), averaged of the betas 
from each activity. To get the beta for each activity simply use the historical 
approach defined above for all the comparable companies in the industry. The 
final step for the beta then is to make a normal average, betas obtained this 
way are called ʻBottoms-upʼ. The error results in an average are far more 
precise than the individual errors; also this approach can be adapted for a 
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change is structure in the companyʼs business mix, (by changing the weights 
on the final average).  
 
Damodaran (2009) points that for financial institutions beta does not need to 
be adjusted for financial leverage. The average levered beta for comparable 





Financial institutions do not have one particular valuation method that fits 
them the best; normal methods just need to be molded to fit its requirements. 
Thus, for the valuation of BPI four methods will be used: FCFE, DDM, relative 
valuation and Excess Return. The final value will be chosen after analyzing 
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Part II. Banking industry 
 
 
1. Banking industry outlook  
The global economy is just now showing signs of strengthening with 
advanced economies growing slowly still. In 2013 global output grew 3%, 
advanced economies 1,3%, while the Eurozone has contracted 0,5% (WEO 
IMF estimates). The growth in developing economies was hurt by the low 
demand from developed ones. This is expected to change in 2014 with the US 
in the center of the trend, as its private demand continues to grow driven by 
the recovery of the labor market (Graph 1). 
 
Graph 1. Unemployment rates (IMF) 
 
Only politics are still causing some degree of uncertainty, mainly due to the 
US as the debate over the shift in the financial policy by the Federal Reserve 
is intensifying. It is expected to generate volatility in the long rates, as the 
reduction of liquidity not only affects the US (which saw its 10-y treasuries 
yields increase from 1.758% to 3.029% in 2013) but also the rest of the world. 
Primarily the emerging markets but also Europe, even if in a lower extent as 
the ECB is keen on letting the markets know its principal refinancing rate and 
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Graph 2. ECB interest rates (EBC data) 
 
By doing this, the ECB is trying to boost confidence levels, private demand, 
investment and ultimately inflation to normal values8.  
A deleveraging effort of the peripheral countries, which has been caused by 
the financial crisis, is still underway, as does a risk aversion environment that 
blocks the banks from financing the private sector, and the private sector itself 
to invest. Southern countries are still struggling; their domestic demand is still 
depressed, with unemployment still to peak in 2014 (Graph 1). 
 
However signs of recovery can be noted, particularly in central countries, 
where a “change in mood” (IMF WEO of October 2013) can be noted as the 





Portuguese discipline in implementing the measures agreed with Troika 
(IMF/ECB/EC) was the main constrain for the national economy. These 
measures were agreed back in 2011, following the 78B€ economic and 
financial assistance plan. All the austerity measures kept internal demand low, 
due to cuts in public spending and tax increases, joined with poor external 
demand, particularly by European countries (70% of the export markets), 
resulted in a contraction of GDP, (Graph 3.), and a degradation of the labor 
market, with unemployment still expected to peak at 17.7%1IMF in the end of 
2014 (Graph 1).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Close	  to,	  but	  not	  reaching	  2%	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Graph 3. Portuguese GDP evolution (IMF) 
 
As a consequence, significant progress was made in stabilizing the budget, 
having for the first time a positive structural balance in several decades (note 
that in 2010 the deficit reached 6% of the GDP). This, aligned with looser 
financial credit restrains in the European market, (Graph 2.), made Portugal 
look less risky to the markets, and thus the Portuguese banking sector. 
Indeed, the Portuguese government and two9 domestic banks already used 
the international wholesale debt market for financing. 
The Portuguese budgetary consolidation, aligned with the new ECB function 
of supervising European banks, gave a very positive signal to the markets, 
making Portuguese debt attractive to investors, which made 10-year yields fell 
bellow 4% (Graph 4.), the lowest since August 2010, in March 2014; closing 
this way the high spreads Portugal was paying over Germany. 
Expectations are for the yields to continue to decrease, in a moment when the 
hunt for high yields is increasing due to ECBʼs negative interest rate policy.  
This conditions enabled Portugal a ʻclean exitʼ from its three-year rescue 
program; emulating this way Ireland. The Government debt evolution is very 
important for the Portuguese banks as they have a high exposure to it, which 
was fuelled by the ECBʼs decision to allow them to be used as collateral for 
refinancing purposes.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Caixa	  Geral	  de	  Depositos	  (CGD)	  and	  Banco	  Espirito	  Santo	  (BES)	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  2014	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Graph 4. European 10y Government debt yields 
 
 
1.2. International activity - Angola 
Angola enjoyed a period of very high economic growth after the civil war 
ended in 2002, with Real GDP growth levels above 20% between 2005 and 
2007. This economic evolution ended in 2008 (Graph 5) when the global 
financial crisis made oil prices fall abruptly.  
 
Graph 5. Angola GDP evolution (IMF) 
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Angolan economy is highly exposed to oil prices, indeed, 45% of the GDP 
comes from oil (down from 47% the year before), being it also responsible for 
95% of the exports and 75% of the public income10.   
 
Graph 6. Composition of Angola GDP10  
 
There is however at the moment an effort to reduce this dependence, with 
government investments in the services sector. Indeed Angola dependence in 
the oil sector is quite worrying; the country has a stable oil production 
regarding volumes, making the countryʼs GDP very correlated with oil prices.  
Still the IMF expects an average real GDP growth of 5,9% for this economy in 
the next years, which is the average growth since 1990 (Graph 6). 
 
Regarding the Financial sector 
Angola still has a low banking services penetration, around 23% in the 
beginning of 201311; indication that there is a lot of potential to grow. The 
structure of the sector is quite concentrated; the biggest 5 banks detain 78% 
of total assets, which may explain why the number of banks has remained 
unchanged in the last years. This highly competitive environment leads to 
banks to grow in size, indeed, the number of branches has been increasing 
year after year, so does the use of ATMs and electronic cards and Internet 
banking. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  BPI	  report	  on	  Angola’s	  Economy,	  December	  2013	  
11	  Contrasting with and average penetration rate of 90% for developed countries	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BPI operates in Angola though BFA, it is focused in costumer deposits 
gathering, where 98% of the funding comes from (also 22% of all the BPI 
group customer resources). The loan portfolio however is quite shy, 
representing only 4% of the groupʼs gross loan portfolio. The bankʼs 
transformation ratio is around 20% not only well below the Portuguese 
counterpart but also well below the Angolan average of 62,7% in the end of 
2012.  
 
Looking forward it is expected that loans continue to grow and thus the 
transformation rations.  The Banco Nacional de Angola, has being providing 
liquidity to the market by reducing the cost of lending and at the same time 
reducing the liquidity absorption interest rate, this is to motivate banks to lend 
to the private sector. 
 
 
2. Regulations in Portugal and Europe 
 
2.1. Basel III - Financial Crisis aftermath 
The 2008 financial crisis exposed how insufficient banking regulation was at 
that point, both at European and global level. The excessive growth in credit, 
before the downturn in the markets, caused such a large quantity of losses 
that overwhelmed the capital financial institutions had reserved, following 
Basel I and II accords. The problem was not only base capital quantity, but 
also capital quality (availability, liquidity management and corporate 
governance also played their role). Governments had to rescue failing 
financial institutions in order to restore the financial sector (and thus the whole 
economy) stability and confidence. In this regard, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued in December 2010 detailed new rules on 
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Table 1. Key Basel II and III rules 
 
Because Basel III are only standards, the EU implements it to all European 
banks though a Regulation, Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and a 
Directive, Capital Requirement Directive, (CRD-IV). 
This regulatory framework will put banks in a stronger position to absorb 
abnormally high market shocks by demanding better and more capital, more 
focused this time in common equity. Even though total capital required will still 
be 8% (10,5% after 2019 adding a conservation Buffer of 2,5%) of risk 
weighted assets (as in Basel II), the amount that has to be of the highest 
quality, common equity tier 1, CET1 increases 2,5 percentage points to 4,5%. 
A leverage backstop to prevent the accumulation of credit, a counter party 
credit risk, capital buffers and a more intense liquidity management are also 
required. The application of these new legislations started in 1 January 2013 
and is schedule to be fully implemented on 1 January 2019.  
 
 
2.2. Transformation Ratios 
A further imposition by the BoP was that until 2014 all the Portuguese banks 
must have a Loan-to-Deposit (LtD) ratio of no more than 120% to ensure 
liquidity in the market, which lead banks to a deleveraging of their portfolios. 
They could accomplish this by attracting deposits; however they were limited 
by a maximum remuneration rate imposed in 2011 by the BoP. This way 
corporate credit was the segment that was hurt the most as banks have 
limited power to reduce mortgage loans. Indeed BPI managed to sustain 
customer resources while reducing corporate credit from 8.7B€ in 2009 to 
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5.3B€ in 2012, achieving this way a LtD ratio of 101% in June 2013 (less than 
100% now, Graph 7). Only other Portuguese banks have already reduced 
their LtD ratio below the maximum threshold of 120%, CGD (with a LtD ratio 
of 107.5% in 2012).  
 
Graph 7. Transformation ratios in Portugal 
 
 
This means that BPI has little dependence in the debt market; so BPI has the 
incentive to take a more aggressive position in credit granting as soon as the 
economy shows signs of strengthening. Aligning this with rising credit 




2.3. Contingent Convertibles - The CoCoʼs 
After 30 June 2012 the European Banking Authority (EBA) required a 
minimum common capital ratio (CET1) of 9% after a stress test to Portuguese 
banks. This recommendation also included a capital buffer for exposure to 
sovereign debt calculated at 30th September 2011 market prices. BPIʼs 
exposure to southern Europe sovereign debt, particularly Greek and 
Portuguese, was the main reason for a capital shortfall that made the financial 
institution carry out a recapitalization plan. That buffer is currently outdated, 
because both Portuguese yields have improved and the exposure to Greek 
debt exposure was eliminated. Still the bank had to hold the buffer until EBAʼs 
reevaluation (expected at the end of 2014). If this buffer was updated as of 
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24th January 2014 prices, the value would decrease 877M€3 (BPI press 
release 30Jan 2014 OPORTO).  
 
The capital shortfall that amounted up to 1,359B€ could not be dealt using 
only private solutions due to the lack of confidence prevailing in the markets at 
the time. Thus BPI was forced to reach to the 12B€ recapitalization facility 
that Troika (ECB, IMF and EC) made available to the Portuguese banks, 
within the scope of the adjustment program, negotiated with the Portuguese 
government. BPI raised 200M€ in a capital issue and 1,5B€ issuing 
convertible bonds (CoCoʼs), which were subscribed by the government. They 
cost the bank dearly, having an effective interest rate of 8.75% (increasing 
every year). This rate is expensive when compared with 7.125% that the 
Portuguese bank BES could get in the wholesale debt market in the beginning 
of 2014.  
BPI managed to payback all the CoCosʼ in the first half of 2014, well before 
the deadline. The ability for BPI to repay the CoCoʼs before the expected date 
was very important, it wont penalize the future growth of Net Interest Income. 
Just in 2013 alone CoCoʼs had a 85M€ negative impact in the Net Profit. 
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2.4. Further stress tests 
This year banks will face new Asset Quality Review by the ECB, these 
reviews are expected to be particularly challenging because the ECB will 
assume supervisor responsibilities as of November 2014. ECBʼs new 
responsibilities may make the tests over demanding, since the Central bank is 
keen in minimize future problems by reducing the risks in the banks balance 
sheets.  
In the Portuguese case the Bank of Portugal and Troika (EC, IMF and ECB) 
have already made several inspections, at least to the Portuguese bankʼs loan 
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Part III. Banco Português de Investimento 
 
 
1. Banco Português de Investimento 
Banco Português de Investimento (BPI) is a financial multi-specialist group 
based in Porto, Portugal. It was conceived in 1981 under the name 
“Sociedade Portuguesa de Investimentos”, having at this stage the specific 
purpose of participating in the creation of a dynamic capital market, with the 
final objective of financing private-sector investment projects. Only 4 years 
later it was renamed “Banco Português de Investimento” (BPI) and 
transformed into a commercial and investment bank. It now has around 2.9 
billion costumers (1.7B and 1.2B in Portugal and Angola respectively), offering 
a wide range of financial services in Portugal and internationally, in Angola 
and Mozambique. It is the 3th largest financial institution in Portugal, quoted in 
Lisbon-Euronext stock market with a market cap of 2.3B€1 MAY 2014 and 
weighting 2,03% in PSI-20 (the Portuguese stock index). BPIʼs Assets as of 
June 2014 were 45Bi€, this was made possible by a number o acquisitions, 
organic growth and expansion to multinational markets (graph 9). 
 
Graph 9. BPIʼs historical evolution (company presentation) 
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Domestic activities are the core business of BPI with 82,9% of the capital 
allocated to it, being 80,6% for commercial banking and only the remaining 
2,3% for financial investments. Internationally BPI holds a leadership position 
in Angola though Banco de Fomento (BFA) (50,1% owned) with market 
shares of 10.9% in loans and 16.2% in deposits. In Mozambique BPI focus on 
retail banking operating though Banco Comercial e de Investimentos (BCI) 
(30% owned), with market shares of 28.6% for deposits and 29.1% for loans.  
 





2. Activity Indicators 
 
2.1. Funding 
Since April 2010 and until very recently, the wholesale debt market was 
closed to Portuguese banks, as the successive credit downgrades to 
Portuguese sovereign debt dragged down Portuguese bankʼs credit ratings as 
well (Graph 11). 
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Table 2. BPIʼs credit ratings 
 
In this scenario the ECB stepped in with the function of lender of last resort, in 
which Portuguese banks relied heavily, reaching a peak of 60.5B€ in June 
2012. BPI is the Portuguese bank that is relying the less in ECBʼs funding; 
both in relative and absolute terms using 4.1B€ or 7,9% of the total 51,8B€. 
The bank has as well very little medium and long-term debt refinancing needs, 
as all the debt until 2017 is covered by the remaining available ECB collateral. 
These low refinancing needs were made possible though a deleveraging 
strategy, while maintaining stable customer resources.  
After this period, is it expected that BPI will be in a strong position to access 
the debt markets. First, the hybrid bonds have already been paid back to the 
government. Second the yields in Portuguese debt are falling, and are 
expected to continue. Third, already two Portuguese banks have successfully 
issued debt to the markets in 4Q13.  
Additionally, one interesting note to take from Table 2 is that one of the three 
agencies already classifies BPI debt as risky as the Portuguese one, which 
just reflects the solid financial situation of the bank. 
 
 
2.2. Customer deposits 
More than half of BPIʼs funding came from deposits (graph 11); they have 
increased significantly since 1Q10 from 17,5B€ to close to 19,5B€ in 1Q12, 
year when they suffered a decrease to 18,5B€. The attraction of new deposits 
was of key importance as other funding solutions, rather than the ECB, were 
limited due to adverse macroeconomic conditions. However during the last 
year deposits have recovered some of their losses; households deposits grew 
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1,1% and non-financial companies 2%12. This increase is noteworthy because 
rates on deposits have been decreasing since 2011 after the penalty on 
capital that the BoP imposed to new deposits with rates above 2,54% until 
3M, 2,89% until 6M and 3,56% for 12M and more. This implies that something 
other than returns is behind the increase in deposits. The households higher 
saving rates may reflect precautionary motives and a change in consumer 
pattern12.  
The mutual fund industry may also have something to say in the evolution of 
deposits, as trust in financial markets was at historical lows (getting better 
now), a risk averse environment is predominant and a run away to more 
conservative capital allocation solutions has been the rule.  
Looking forward, as these non-recurring situations fade away, bank deposits 
may become uncompetitive when compared to other asset class particularly 
Portuguese government debt. 
 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Half	  year	  2013	  BPI	  report	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2.3. Asset-Quality and Loan portfolio 
After entering in the Eurozone, Portugal benefited from historical low interest 
rates and thus an easy access to the credit market. Households, corporate 
and even the government overused the loose financial conditions, making 
credit growth way superior to GDP growth, which is simply unbearable in the 
long term. Indeed after the 2008 financial crisis credit growth declined sharply 
being now negative. 
 
Graph 12. Portuguese Government Credit13 Vs GDP  
 
In 2012, indebtedness as a percentage of the GDP was 124,1% (almost 
double of the European average) for the government and 223% for the private 
sector (the European average is 156,6%).  
 
In the years after the financial crisis, the deterioration of the macroeconomic 
environment caused a sharp reduction in the available income, this lead to the 
increase of Non-performing Loans in the banking sector. Not every sector was 
affected the same way, being the most affected consumer loans as they 
depend mostly in unemployment and disposable income. The least affected 
segment was mortgages; they depend more in housing prices, future income 
and interest rates, which have been at historical lows. The corporate sector is 
in a middle term, they are not as dependent in the economy as the consumer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Measured	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP.	  Units	  are	  growth	  rates.	  IMF	  WEO	  2014	  data.	  
	  
	   34	  
segment, still they have been suffering from companiesʼ decreasing 
profitability that may prevent them to make the loan repayments. 
BPIʼs credit portfolio, which is mainly domestic (96%), is 46% mortgages and 
40% corporate debt, with only 10% consumption.  
 
Graph 13. BPIʼs domestic credit portfolio breakdown 
 
This portfolio structure helped BPI maintaining a low Non-Performing Loan 
Ratio (NPL) of 5% (in 2013) compared with Ratios above 10% for the other 
two large financial institutions in Portugal (BES and BCP).  
 
Graph 14. BPIʼs Non-performing loans (% loan portfolio) 
 
Looking ahead it is expected that the Asset quality will stop decreasing 
however not instantly. Even though its expected that the 2014 Portuguese 
GDP evolution to be positive, there is normally a lag of 3 quarters until for the 
positive macroeconomic signals to have an effect in the credit portfolio, thus it 
is expected that the negative trend will end in the last quarter of 2014.  
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2.4. Profitability and Performance 
Profitability in all Portuguese Financial institutions has being challenged by 
the poor macroeconomic environment, more noticeably by the decrease in 
Net Interest Income (NII). It came under stress due to the deleveraging 
impositions made by the BoP and the increase in credit provisions and 
impairments; caused by the deterioration of asset quality. BPI has, however, 
been the most resilience to the adverse environment of all the Portuguese 
banks, due to the mortgage-based structure of the credit portfolio and the 
good performance of its international operations. 
 
Graph 14. BPIʼs Net Interest Income and Net Profit (M€) 
 
BPIʼs Group Net Profit in 2013 was 66.8M€, 182,3M€ less than in 2012.  
Domestically, in 2013, the contribution to the consolidated net income was 
negative, which can be explained first by the decrease in the NII and secondly 
by a decrease in profit from financial operations.  
As for the NII, the biggest challenge was the higher CoCoʼs cost that 
amounted to 85M€ in 2013 (from 56M€ in 2012). Also the increasing costs to 
attract customer resources combined with a low Euribor (as most loans rates 
are defined as a spread over it) created a contraction in the average margin 
on sight deposits.  Finally the sale of a portfolio of Portuguese Bonds with 
high yield that generated in 2012 76M€ in interest income and only 2M€ in 
2013. 
	  
	   36	  
Net Commissions decreased by 9% due to the reduction of corporate bounds 
issues. Since the financial crisis this source of income as been below the 
normal as a risk-averse environment prevails and costumers prefer on-
balance sheet assets rather then off-balance sheet, which also makes 
commissions related to credit to consumption lower (like credit cards). 
 
Results from financial operations are the most volatile, depending in the 
composition of the financial assets portfolio, which in BPIʼs case is 82% 
composed of Southern European countries debt, and how their price varies in 
the market.  
 
Graph 15. BPIʼs Gains or Losses from financial operations (M€) 
 
The 171,6M€ in income generated in 2013 is mostly due to the liquidation of 
Treasury bonds acquired in 2012.  
Looking ahead its foreseeable that BPIʼs profitability will improve. First credit 
spreads have already started to improve, as banks will stop competing to 
attract costumers and loans are being reprised; this adjustment will take more 
time to BPI as its credit portfolio structure is more long-term (mortgages). It is 
also important to notice that BPIʼs LtD ratio is below 100% (well below the 
imposed 120%) so the bank has some slack to increase its loan portfolio as 
soon as credit spreads start to pick up. Non Performing Loans (NPL) are still 
to peak as employment rate is expected to grow still this year (Graph 1), but 
will start to recover after that. As for commissions, a positive evolution is 
expected as the macroeconomic environment is showing signs of recovery, 
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the high-risk-averse environment is fading away and new products are being 
placed in the market. The trading income is mostly dependent in the evolution 
of the south European debt yields, which even though they are also expected 
to have a positive evolution BPI has decided to follow a conservative 
approach and reduce to half its position. 
 
 
2.5. Operating costs 
BPI has an efficiency ratio14 quite high compared with other important 
Portuguese banks.  
 
Graph 16. BPIʼs Efficiency Ratio14 
 
This implies that BPI still has space for improvement. Indeed, included in 
BPIʼs recapitalization plan there are a group of measures aimed at reducing 
the bankʼs operating costs. The most significant ones due to its weight on the 
P&L of the bank are: reducing the number of employees to 6000 by 2015, (a 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Calculated	  as:	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  Net	  Operating	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2.6. Return on Equity 
After the financial crash in 2008 all major banks have seen their profitability 
plunge. This is quite clear when looking to BPIʼs ROE, with a value of 24,7% 
in 2007 and only 2,9% in 2013. This was mainly due to the big decrease in net 
income (around 58%) in 2008 that hasnʼt pick up yet. It is however interesting 
to look at only international figures, where the ROE has been significantly 
higher during the whole period (2007-2013). Looking forward, as the net 
income is expected to rise, the ROE will improve even if not to the 2007 
levels. 
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Part IV. Valuation 
 
1. Introduction 
I will first expose the reasoning behind the key drivers of the balance sheet 
and the P&L for the bank. Once a clear understanding of how the bankʼs 
balance sheet and P&L will look like in the future I will breakdown the most 
important inputs used for the different models. Finally I am going to compare 




2. Loans, Deposits and NII 
 
2.1. Loan volumes 
Loans to customers are the most important component of BPIʼs Asset base, 
(between 60 and 70%, Graph 18.), it is important thus, to understand why 
Loans have been decreasing since 2010 and why 2014 will be the turning 
point.  
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As in Part II, the Portuguese financial system went through a deleveraging 
effort, as the Bank of Portugal imposed new rules regarding Loan-to-deposit 
ratios. Since resources were difficult to obtain, due to the lack of liquidity in the 
markets following the financial crisis, BPI (and all the other financial 
institutions in Portugal) needed to reduce its Loan portfolio. BPI started with a 
Loan-to-deposit ratio of 136% (calculated in accordance with Bank of Portugal 
Instruction 23/2011), Graph 19, and reached a ratio of 92% in January 2014.  
 
Graph 19. BPIʼs LtD ratio 
 
This was possible because BPI was able to maintain the customer base; 
which was a difficult exercise, as deposits where in short of supply for all the 
demand in the banking sector. Indeed competition over interest rates on 
deposits was so fierce that the BoP imposed a celling (penalization over a 
certain rate). Another factor that helped the bank reach this ratio was the 
significant decrease in financing to the public sector that between 2012 and 
2013 decreased 27%, while to non-financial companies only decreased 6,6% 
(-8,4% to customer loans).  
However volumes are expected to pick up after 2014, supported by the 
recovery of the Portuguese economy (mostly backed by exports). BPI is in an 
exceptional position to benefit from this shift in economic environment, as it 
has LtD ratios well below the 120% imposed, being this way in a position to 
expand when desired.   
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Thus, loans are expected to increase with the bankʼs new appetite, supported 




2.2. Deposit volumes 
Since 2009 following the financial crisis, and most significantly the South-
European sovereign crisis, resources were very difficult (and pricy) to obtain 
as the financial markets closed up for the Portuguese government and thus to 
Portuguese banks. To face this imposed restriction financial institutions in 
Portugal turned to customer deposits at a time when the national GDP was 
contracting savings were not easily available, which created such a rate war 
between banks, in order to attract the few savings available, that the bank of 
Portugal needed to intervene, imposing restrictions on deposit yields. So in 
order to maintain deposits BPI sacrificed profitability increasing its deposits  
Yields.  
 
Graph 19. BPIʼs Liabilities and total deposits 
 
I believed that 2014 is also the turning point for deposits, as in May the 
Portuguese government announced the exit from the EU-IMF program, the 
markets have returned the confidence to the Portuguese banking system. This 
	  
	   42	  
enabled not only the government (that is already borrowing at rates below 4% 
but also Portuguese15 banks to access the financial markets.  
There are thus two forces moving customer deposits now: first the lesser 
need from banks to attract them (and thus a foreseeable reduction in yields) 
and the availability of more attractive ways to invest savings (also a shift in 
risk appetite), as other asset classes will become more attractive (government 
debt being on the top of the list). For deposits I expect an increase following 
GDP as more disposable income became available. 
 
 
2.3. Net interest income - the NII 
Net interest income has been under pressure in the last years for the whole 
market of commercial banking in Europe; BPI was no exception. For BPI 
volume wise, credits have been falling while deposits have remained 
constant. In past years, deposit yields have come up while credit spreads 
have already reached a maximum over the historically low EURIBOR that is 
why the need for a more aggressive credit strategy is required.  
On the cost side the high cost with the CoCoʼs has alone penalized 167,7M€ 
since 2012; that is one of the reasons why BPI was so keen on paying back 
the government as fast as possible.  
Looking forward, a NII recovery is expected: first the CoCoʼs have been fully 
reimbursed; second the Portuguese economy is picking up again showing 
positive growth still in 2014. Third, and most importantly, a new credit 
structure is expected (more corporate). BPIʼs focused on mortgage loans have 
made the bank more resilient to the macroeconomic downturn, it has also 
made the recovery longer as this kind of credit takes more time in the re-
pricing process. A shift to a more corporate structure may come naturally, not 
only as a result of a change in policy as the new number of mortgages is 
lower than the amount being paid. The demand for loans by the corporate 
sector will surpass the demand by individuals as the risk mentality shifts and 
the economy is able to absolve higher investment levels (Graph 20).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Indeed, two have already issued debt in 2014, CGD and BES	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Graph 20. Total Investment in Portugal16 
 
 
Graph 21. BPIʼs term deposit spread and 3M Euribor Rate17 
 
According to DG ECFINʼs 18 estimates, the saving rates (for households), 
which was 12.6% in 2013, will be 11.6% for 2014 and 12% for 2015, while 
investment (Gross fixed capital formation) was -6.6% in 2013 with estimates 
of 3.3% and 3.8% for 2014 and 2015 (Graph 20). From Graph 21 a shift can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Total	  gross	  capital	  formation	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  national	  GDP	  
17	  Both	  graph	  taken	  from	  BPI	  2013	  Report	  
18	  Directorate	  General	  for	  Economic	  and	  Financial	  Affairs	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be seen both in deposit spreads and in the Euribor19; while the former rates 
started to decrease the former start to increase.  
In Table 3 (below) I display my expectations for both credit and loan yields as 
well as the calculated NII for Domestic activities. 
 
Table 3. NII calculations for Domestic activities  
 
 
2.4. International Activities 
International activities, particularly in Angola, have been supporting BPIʼs 
earnings, with a net profit of 95,5M€ against a net loss of 28,3M€ for Portugal 
in 2013. Customer resources have increases systematically as banking 
penetration in Angola becomes widely spread. BPIʼs international activity have 
LtD ratios in the order of 20%, which is less than one third of the average in 
Angola. 
 Looking forward I expect this ratio to increase. In Angola the government is 
making efforts to make the economy less reliant on the oil sector by making 
big investments, trying to boast the rest of the economy. A higher demand for 
loans is thus expected. 
Table 4. NII calculations for International activities 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  The	  3M	  Euribor	  is	  the	  main	  reference	  rate	  for	  Loans	  in	  Europe	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3. Financial operations and Commissions 
 
3.1. Commissions  
This is a very significant source of income for BPIʼs activities, particularly 
domestic ones (around 30% of Net operating income). The most significant 
component is Banking Services followed by Insurance Brokerage (73% and 
12,5% respectfully in 2013). Commission income does not present a lot of 
volatility neither in domestic nor international activities. Because the main 
component is Banking Services, that include such services as bond 
placements and banking brokerage, it is expected that this income will growth 
with the economy, as the corporate sector gets ready to grow again, 
associated financial services should grow comparably. The table below shows 
expected commissions for both domestic and international activities, growing 
with GDP after 2014. 
 
Table 5. Commission Income calculations (M€) 
 
 
3.2. Income from financial Assets 
This source of income is very different between Domestic and International 
activities. In Portugal it is very volatile; in the last years this can be explained 
not only by the big exposure to south-European government debt, but also by 
the extensive use of derivatives (to protect the bank against interest rates 
movements). Indeed in the first half of 2014 a loss of 102 M€ after taxes was 
register due to the sale, in April, of half the position on long-term Portuguese 
and Italian debt (850M€ and 487,5M€ respectfully). The sale itself originated 
a profit of 64M€, the position on related swaps caused the loss.  
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This sale was made reflecting a more cautionary attitude of the bank 
regarding the future, as, following Basel III rules, since 1st January 2014 the 
potential losses associated with government debt will be reflected, at market 
prices, in the CET 1 ratio. This would imply that a flotation in prices could lead 
the bank to need again an increase of capital, even if the debt was actually 
repaid at maturity.   
Regarding international activities the income tends to be more stable due to a 
different exposition that does not suffer with the volatilities of European 
markets.  
Looking forward, the expected future financial assets income will reflect a 
more conservative attitude in Portugal and a steady increase (with the 
economy) in international activities (Table 6). 
 




Under BPIʼs restructuring plan the DG COMP20 imposed three quantitative 
measures that BPI needed to comply until 2015. Two of them were already 
completed in the first half of 2014: the closure of 50 commercial units in 
Portugal, and the reduction of core assets by 700M€, which was easy to 
comply since the Loan portfolio, was decreasing anyway. The third was the 
reduction of headcount to 6.000 employees, which means that BPI needed to 
let go 363 employees. The president guaranteed that this would not be 
accomplished by massive collective terminations, indeed, BPI had already in 
implementation early retirement programs that accounted for 90 employees, 
but BPI still misses a further 166 (in the first half of 2014) to reach the 2015 
goal.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  European commission for competition	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Having this in consideration, the expected personal costs have been 
calculated expecting the restructuring plan agreed with DG COMP would be 
honored until 2015. In the near future, BPI is expected to maintain them 
constant, growing only with inflation (Table 7).  
 
Table 7. Costs with personal calculations (M€) 
 
The opposite is expected of international activities; customer base and 
distribution networks have been expanding since 2008 (Graph 22). BPI is 
committed to strengthen its activities both in Angola and Mozambique, where, 
at the moment, most of the profit comes from. Angola has a very concentrated 
banking market, which makes investment in growth crucial to survive the 
competition. I will assume the current trend is going to continue.  
 
Graph 22. Employees, Customer Base and Distribution Network overseas21 
 
Regarding ʻOutsider Suppliers and Servicesʼ, its value as a percentage of 
Operating Revenue have been stable in the last years, and it is expected to 
remain the same.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Data	  from	  BPI’s	  23	  July	  2014	  presentation	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Regarding international activities, personal costs are expected to increase 
with GDP following the desire of BPI to invest in its international operations, 
and the costs regarding outside suppliers were calculated the same way as 
for Domestic activities.  
 
 
5. Pension Liabilities 
Pension Liabilities are an additional source of risk for any bank. Since 2011 
Actuarial losses or gains ceased to be resisted on the balance sheet under 
assets or liabilities to be registered directly on Shareholders equity under the 
banner ʻOther Comprehensive Incomeʼ. Following Basel III full implementation 
rules, banks will need to adjust regulatory capital for actuarial differences. 
This could be potentially alarming since the size of the pension fund is more 
than 50% of the total market capitalization of BPI.  
The used discount rates for the pensions were 4,5% in 2013 and expected to 
decrease to below 4% in 2014; Table 8 was extracted from BPIʼs 2013 Annual 
Report: 
 
Table 8. Actuarial Assumptions (BPI 2013 Annual Report) 
 
However, the average annual returns from the funds, of around 16% last year, 
and with an average of 9,1% since inception, creates a confortable positive 
actuarial income capable of absorbing actuarial losses from changes in 
assumptions (Graph 23). Furthermore, BPI has a ʻPrudential Corridorʼ that 
stands at 112M€ in 2013. This buffer was able to absolve accumulated 
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actuarial losses 92,4M€ (with and increase of 2.9M€ in that year) so no 
change was made to regulatory capital resulting from pension funds. I 
concluded thus, that variations on actuarial values do not pose a significant 
threat to the bankʼs capital ratios; even though they might have an impact on 
its profitability.  
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Following the literature review I will apply four different valuation 
methodologies, (FCFE, DDM, Excess Return and Relative Valuation), 
compare the results and evaluate why different values were obtained. Finally I 
will determine the most reliable model regarding the selected inputs.  
 
 
2. Inputs to the model  
For the models that require an explicit period I chose 6 years; I believe that 
banks do not need a bigger period, as their cash flows tend to be more stable 
in terms of cash flows. Also they are more dependent in the real economy 
than most other industries, and trying to predict economic conditions for a 
longer period would be a subjective exercise at least. 
 
Having in consideration the importance of BPIʼs international activities to its 
value, I decided to valuate domestic and international activities separately and 
use the sum-of-the-parts technique. This will allow me not only to use different 
inputs in the models but also different assumptions for the future. Regarding 
that BPIʼs international activities are focused in a developing country, Angola, 
this approach is even more meaningful.  
 
 
2.1. Macroeconomic future 
In Portugal after a contraction on GDP in 2013 a recovery is expected22 for 
2014 as described (Table 9 below). For Angola a stabilization of oil prices and 
a growth of the non-oil sector are expected to make the economy grow at 
comfortable levels.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  ECOFIN	  and	  IMF	  estimates	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BPI is expected to pay 40%23 dividends again in 2016 given that it is their 
policy, and the reason the bank stopped the payments ceased to exist (the full 
amount of CoCoʼs have been payback to the Portuguese government in 
2014). I do not expect dividends in 2015 due to a more conservative attitude 
by the bank, and a need to recover from big losses in 2014 regarding the 
decision of selling half of its government debt portfolio.  
 




2.2. Discount rate and Beta 
As I will use discounted cash flow to equity models the appropriate discount 
rate is the cost-of-equity (Ke). For its estimation I used the CAPM model, with 









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  40%	  is	  the	  Dividend	  policy	  practiced	  by	  the	  bank	  and	  stated	  it	  2013	  annual	  report	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Table 9. Cost of equity calculations 
 
 
Domestic beta was estimated by making a regression of an European Bank 
index (SX7E Index) against a European market index (SXXP) for 2 years 
using monthly returns. My choice to use an index and not the average of the 
peer group betas (bottoms-up beta) was first because the betas I got from the 
peer group were very disperse, ranging from -2.19 (Banco Pastor) to 2.3 
(BES). Second the Bank index is already diversified, and, as we seen from the 
last financial crisis, bank activity is very correlated, so a European Bank index 
will represent the risk the industry in general adds to the whole market risk, 
instead of just south-European banks. Third, the beta I calculated was very 
close to internal BPI calculations (1,799). For the international activities, 
lacking of traded banks in Angola I used the domestic beta. 
For the Risk free rate I used the average yield for the 10y Government bonds 
of Euro-Area countries with AAA rating (Luxemburg1, Austria and Germany in 
May 2014). To determine the international activities risk free rate I used the 
domestic rate and add the differential from Angolaʼs inflation and Europe 
inflation.  
Market risk premium was obtained by looking at an average mature market 
(SP500) returns above the risk free (10y treasury bonds), since 1928 until 
2013. I used S&P500 index because I consider it to be the best proxy for a 
mature, advanced economy market. 
The Country Risk Premium (CRP) should be looked at as the Risk free rate; 
itʼs the risk that cannot be diversified away. Because the financial markets are 
so integrated now I considered that domestic CRP could be diversified away, 
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thus I only add a CRP to the international activities Ke. This CRP was 
obtained from Damoadran website24, calculated as the default spread based 
on Moodyʼs ratings. 
For the terminal value (Table 10) I reduced the beta to 1.1; this is because 
when a firm is in stable growth, it tends to be less exposed to market risk, 
making more conservative investments, and thus the beta should converge to 
the market 1. However, I considered that banks are still a volatile business, 
always more than the market so I allowed a small difference of +0.1 to the 
market25.  
As long term Risk free rate (Rf) I used the actual 10y US treasury yields, as I 
considered the AAA-rated EU Gov. yields excessively low26; also the US debt 
in the long term is considered to be the ultimate risk free.  
Market Risk premium (Rmp) was maintained. 
 
Table 10. Terminal value Cost of Equity Calculations 
 
 
2.3. Return on Equity 
ROE is one of the most important value drivers for financial institutions. 
Having an accurate estimate of what the future ROE for BPI will be is of key 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Last	  updated	  in	  January	  2014	  
25	  Damodaran	  acknowledges	  this	  possibility	  and	  considers	  this	  approach	  reasonable	  as	  long	  as	  
the	  long-­‐term	  beta	  is	  not	  bigger	  than	  1.2	  
26	  This is because of the risk-averse environment in Europe. Still only 3 economies have AAA 
ratings, which create a huge demand, particularly from the investment fund community. 
Indeed 10y German bonds yields are less than 1% in September 2004).	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importance; it will determine (together with the earnings retention rate) the 
growth in the DDM model and the excess value in the Excess returns model.  
Since 2009 BPI, and banks in general, have been adjusting to the new 
macroeconomic and regulatory environment. Having this in mind I cannot look 
to recent ROE values to predict the future, (specially in BPIʼs case as 
expected 2014 ROE is negative).  
Damodaran said that companies cannot earn excess returns forever so in the 
steady state returns should tend to the industry average.  
I looked to BPIʼs average ROE over a longer period (since 2005), I also 
looked to the industryʼs average (Table 11). 
 
Table 11. ROE for banks over the last 10 years (www.bankregdata.com) 
 
 
Because I did not want to rely only in past values I looked at the industryʼs 
participants expectations about the future; Graph 24 below shows the 
answers of about 300 senior executives of different banks around the world 
(survey carried out by The Economist Intelligence Unit in 2014).  With this 
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Graph 24. The Economist Intelligence Unit 2014 Banking survey results 
“Question: What is your bank current ROE? And what do you expect it to be in 
2020?” (% respondents)  
 
For international operations I used mainly past values, and, for the particular 
case of the Angola market I assume an ROE of 20%. This value is slightly 
below the average for BFA because I needed to have in consideration the 
increase in competition in the market. 
 
 
2.4. Terminal Value – The valuation menace   
One of the biggest critics to discount cash flow models is the excessive 
importance of the terminal value (TV) in the valuation. Due to its weight on the 
valuation, a slight change in its inputs will case the value of the company to 
change significantly; and thus making it very easy to manipulate, reflecting 
this way analystʼs biases. This is particularly true when deciding the stable 
growth rate, because it is constant forever. To make the valuation less 
sensitive to assumptions about stable growth I will use Damodaran approach 
of linking it to the equity reinvestment rate (for FCFE) or retention rate (for 
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DDM). I am assuming here that the firm will reinvest  (or retain)27 only enough 
to sustain its stable growth.  








Retention ratio = (1-payout ratio) 
! is the stable growth rate 
!"#!" is the Long-term expected Return on equity  
 
How much it needs to reinvest depends on the difference between expected 
ROE and the long-term cost-of-capital, in other words, excess return. If cost of 
capital = ROE than stable growth rate will not matter to the valuation at all: 
does not matter how much a company reinvests if the returns are going to be 
equal to the costs, the company is not adding any value. If the ke > ROW then 
the less the company reinvests (or retains) the better, as the company is 
actually destroying value to the shareholders. 
 
Table 12. Terminal value inputs 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  As firms in stable growth reinvest less	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Now the value I choose for g will have a rational effect on the valuation, as the 
company will have to reinvest (FCFE) or retain (DDM) more capital (see 
sensitivity analysis) if it wants to grow at a higher rate, making one movement 
offset partially the other.  
 
Both excess returns and stable growth rates are at reasonable values: no 
more than 3% for the excess returns28 and no more than the GDP growth for 
g29. The average GDP growth for advanced economies is 2%30 (IMF data 





















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  As	  a	  company	  cannot	  have	  a	  big	  competitive	  advantage	  forever.	  Damodaran	  rule	  of	  thumb	  is	  no	  
more	  than	  3%	  excess	  return	  in	  the	  long-­‐term.	  
29	  A	  company	  cannot	  outperform	  the	  Market	  forever	  
30	  2%	  is	  also	  the	  average	  Portuguese	  GDP	  growth	  from	  1980	  to	  2014	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Part VI. Valuation results 
 
 
1. Free cash Flow to Equity 
As discussed in the literature review I will use the FCFE approach adapted to 
financial institutions, which means making the reinvestment needs equal to 
investment in regulatory capital. The results are summarized in the Table 13. 
 
Table 13. FCFE results 
M€   Domestic International 
Explicit period (PV) 286.90 294.38 
TV (PV) 1,773.76 274.57 
TOTAL Valuation 2,060.66 568.95 
Num. Shares (M) 1456.9  
Price per share  €         1.80   
 
 
For the detailed Cash flow schedule refer to Exhibit 8.  
 
2. Dividend Discount model  
For this valuation I assumed dividends are going to be paid again after 2016 
at a rate of 40%; for the long term dividends I applied the approach described 
in Part V, 2.4 – Terminal Value (for more details refer to Exhibit 9). Table 14 
(below) summarize my result of €1.68 per share (15% above the actual price) 
 
Table 14. DDM results 
M€  Domestic International 
Explicit period (PV) 282.60 113.75 
TV (PV) 1,773.76 274.57 
TOTAL Valuation 2,056.36 388.32 
Num. Shares (M) 1456.9  
Price per share  €        1.68   
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Note that for both FCFE and DDM the most significant part of the valuation, 
the TV is the same; this is because I used the same approach to the same 
inputs. What changes in the DDM approach is the explicit period valuation, 
benefiting domestic operations (not counting the first years with losses) and 
hurting international ones by not paying dividends in the first years.  
 
 
3. Residual Income  
Following this model, the value of BPI will be the actual equity invested31 plus 
the sum of the future value that the bank is expected to create above its cost 
of capital. The results of this valuation are interesting to analyze; BPI now 
trades just above its book value, which implies that it will generate more value 
(ROE) than the costs of generating it (cost of equity). It is however 
foreseeable that in the coming years BPIʼs cost of equity will be above its 
ROE, this is due to both a high cost of equity imposed on BPI from general 
market conditions (beta is 1.82) and a low ROE, even negative in 2014. I do 
not believe that will last, as markets return to normality so does BPIʼs cost of 
equity.  Assuming a beta of 1.1 (closer to the market and the average sector 
beta) the cost of equity will be less than the long-term ROE (10%), thus I 
believe that BPI will generate value. For international operations BPI is 
already generating excess value. My result was €1.70 per share, summarized 
in Table 15. 
 
Table 15. Excess Return Model results 
M€                                                     Domestic  International 
Explicit period (PV) -     195.87 122.70 
TV (PV) 497.53 88.36 
Equity at 2013 1618.851 350.2 
TOTAL Valuation 1,920.51 561.27 
Num. Shares (M) 1456.9  
Price per share  €        1.70   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Valuated at BV, this is a reasonable assumption due to the accounting nature of banks, as  
explained in the literature review	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4. Relative valuation 
This kind of valuation is useful to compare my previous results and see how 
markets are pricing BPI; however this approach needs to be look at carefully 
as this is only a static valuation and it depends in the mood of the markets 
(that changes very quickly). Also this valuation depends on the companies I 
choose as comparable with BPI, which is even more difficult for financial 
institutions; banks by nature tend to have activities across countries that may 
diverge from its core ones. Also, each bank tends to be a specific case, with 
its own set of investments and revenue sources, which makes two banks 
hardy comparable.  
As I learned in the Literature review, Damodaran (2009) suggest the use of 
Price-to-earnings (P/E) and Price-to-book-value (P/BV) ratios, however BPI  
is, with a high degree of certainty, is not going to have profits in 2014 (already 
disclosed losses of >100M€ in 2Q) ; thus I will use only P/BV. This ratio is 
very dependent on ROE, (future profitability determines if the company is 
expected to generate value or not), so I took it in consideration when choosing 
the peer value. In this decision in addiction to ROE I used CET1 ratio and LtD 
as a measure of risk, and determine their culture, if more risk-taker or 
conservative. Adding to this, I also looked at the Country where they are 
based and, most importantly, operate.   
 
Table 16. Relative Valuation Results 
Bank Country P/BV 
Banco de 
Sabadell ES  0,60    
Bankinter ES  1,58    
BBVA ES  1,21    
BNP FR  0,81    
Santander ES  1,19    
Credit Agricole FR  0,66    
Average   1,01 
BPI PT 1,11 
   
 
BPI's Equity 
2013 (M€) 1571,7 
 
Shares 1190 
   
 
Price per share € 1,33  
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I will not use this value for my final valuation for three main reasons: first 
these ratios are based on FY2013 data (except BPI that is 2Q2014), and 
during the last half-year a lot have changed. Second I believe that markets are 
still penalizing banks from the adverse macroeconomic conditions faced since 
2011.  
Indeed this result is not surprising as 4 out of 6 analysts still have a negative 
view of BPI (Table 17). Third, this kind of valuation is very dependent on the 
chosen peer group, which can be a subjective exercise, differing this way from 
analyst to analyst. A mathematical approach, like a cluster analysis, could be 
used to remove this subjectivity; however I believe that that bank industry is 
too complex, (each bank has its own mix of investments), that finding one 
peer group better than other cannot be universally true.  
 
Table 17. Analysts Recommendations (taken from BPIʼs website) 
 
Interestingly enough, the value I found using this valuation is very similar to 
the one I obtained for the domestic activities in the other models, which may 
imply markets are penalizing the BPI group by focusing only on the 
Portuguese macroeconomic situation.  
 
 
5. Results Conclusion 
In my valuation of BPI I looked at both its past (and the industry past) and, at 
its future.  
I looked at historical averages for some of the main inputs, (as the ROE), to 
try to remove subjectivity from the valuation. I also do believe that banks are 
emerging from the sovereign crisis more focused in their core business, and 
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so returning to their previous structure. Considering this, historical averages 
will not yield unreasonable values.  
I looked at the future for the key drivers of the bankʼs balance sheet and P&L. 
I analyzed the economic environment to find the most likely evolution of 
customer deposits and resources, not only in volume and also its composition. 
I also analyzed future regulatory requirements that will dictate BPIʼs 
opportunities to grow.  
 
My final valuation of BPI will be a simple average of the FCFE and the 
Excess model. I considered these two to capture the evolution of BPI the best: 
both penalize BPI in the present for failing to be profitable in the domestic 
market while capturing the future opportunities of the bank.  
 
Table 18. Final valuation 
Model            Price per share 
FCFE           1.80 
EXCESS           1.70 
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Part VII. Comparison - BCP Millennium 
Investment Bank  
 
In this section I will compare my valuation to the one that Millennium 
Investment Bank (BCP) arrived following its 24 of July 2014 report on BPI. I 
will also investigate why the valuations differ.  
 
BCP values each share of BPI at 1,6€, 8.69% below my valuation but still 
9,5% above the actual market price of 1,466 (in 24 July 2014).  
As learned in the literature review if different valuation methods arrive at 
different values it should be caused by the subjectivity of the inputs/ 
assumptions. Indeed BCP used one of the models I also used, the FCFE, so 
the difference in the valuation must reside on the inputs.  
Still regarding the methodology, BCP values the company as a whole, not 
making different assumptions for the two main regions where BPI operates. 
Doing this BCP does not capture the volatility of international markets, from 
where most of the profits are coming, which will have an impact on the 
discount rate.  
 
Table 19. Millennium BCP inputs 
 
BCP uses a rate of 12.8% in the first periods and 11.6% in middle periods, 
which is lower than my consolidated discount rate of 14% (1 80% domestic 
20% international). The fact that I discount at higher does not make my 
valuation lower, because of the Terminal value, where I use a smaller 
discount rate. It makes sense having higher rates during the explicit period, as 
there is still some degree of uncertainty about the future macrocosmic 
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conditions of Europe. However in stable growth the discount rate should go 
down, reflecting less risk in the industry as nem regulations are being 
implemented and the ECB will assume supervision status in Europe.  
 
Regarding now assumptions, I first looked at the key driver of the P&L, the 
Net Interest margin.  
  
Table 20. Loans to Customers and Customer Resources 
 
I was slightly more optimistic regarding the volume evolution. As I explained 
above I believe that BPI is going to increase its loans books as soon as the 
market picks up (expected to be 2014 already). BPI has a lot of capacity to 
use; I estimated a LtD ratio of 106.6% for 2019, which is still a very 
comfortable situation (the imposed limit is 120%).                                                                                      
 
Table 21. Net Interest Margin comparison  
 
Simultaneously I expect that the NIM will improve; BCP does the same but in 
a lesser extent. Because I expect the portfolio structure to change to more 
corporate loans in the future, as the economy picks up, I also considered the 
impact on cost of credit (Table 22). 
 
Table 22. Cost of Credit Risk32 calculations 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Calculated as impairments over the Loan book net of recoveries	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Final recommendations: 
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Part VIII. Annexes  
1. Domestic P&L (M€) 
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3. Consolidated P&L (M€) 
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4. Domestic Balance Sheet (M€) 
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5. International Balance Sheet (M€) 
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6. Consolidated Balance Sheet (M€) 
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7. Shareholders equity calculations (M€) 
 
For Domestic operations I calculated the Shareholders capital based on the Basel III rules the bank will have to follow. For 
international operations I based my calculations assuming the bank will maintain its solvency ratio33 average; note that the 
minimum imposed by the Bank of Angola is 10%. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Calculated	  following	  Bank	  of	  Angola	  Recommendations:	  Risk	  weighted	  assets/	  (shareholders	  equity	  +	  minority	  interests)	  
	  
	   73	  
 
8. Free Cash Flow to Equity Model calculations (M€) 
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9. Dividend Discount Model calculations (M€) 
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List of abbreviations  
 
BoP: Bank of Portugal 
 
BPC: Millennium Banco Comercial Português  
 
BPI: Banco Português Investimento 
 
CAPM: Capital Asset Pricing Model 
 
CET1: Core Equity Tier1 
 
CRP: Country Risk Premium  
 
DDM: Dividend discount model 
 
ECB: European Central Bank 
 
FCFE: Free Cash Flow to Equity 
 
g: Stable growth rate 
 
Ke: Cost of equity 
 
NII: Net Interest Income 
 
NPL: Non-Performing Loans 
 
RF: Risk Free 
 
Rmp: Market risk premium 
 
ROE: Return on equity 
 
RWA: Risk-weighted asset 
 
WACC: Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
 
 
